‘Following on from the first post focusing on the double-lock in the Investigatory Powers Bill (“the Bill”). This second entry looks at the “institutional and procedural” issues around the introduction of judicial scrutiny of surveillance warrants in the UK. Therefore, attention is on the office of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCr) itself. I will assess the degree to which the IPCr is independent from the executive. Thereafter, consideration is given to the procedure by which the Judicial Commissioners (JCs) will conduct their ex ante oversight function. Concerns in both these areas were raised when a Draft version of the Bill was before a Joint Committee of Parliament (“the Committee”). After nearly four months of gathering both written and oral evidence, the Committee reported in February and the Bill got its second reading on March 15th this year.’
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UK Constitutional Law Association, 15th April 2016
Source: www.ukconstitutionallaw.org