‘The first part of this blog outlined the facts and decision in the Supreme Court case, Secretary of State for Business and Trade v Mercer, as well as the approach the Court took in distinguishing between private sector and public sector employment. The second part of this blog considers the approach of the Supreme Court in distinguishing between the “core” and “essential” in respect of trade union rights. While the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is sometimes a little opaque, these two terms are not interchangeable in RMT. The right to strike is not yet designated as an “essential” trade union freedom, though it is an integral prop to other “essential” rights such as the right to make representations and the right to bargain collectively. In RMT, the distinction between “core” and “accessory” is being used in a different sense, to emphasise gradations of importance within a specific right (“essential” or otherwise). In RMT, for example, the Court was drawing a distinction between primary strike action, which was “core” and deserving of stronger protection, and “secondary” strike action which was “accessory” and therefore amenable to a wider margin of appreciation. The situation in Mercer involved a primary strike, and hence applying RMT it was at the “core” of the right to strike. This conceptual distinction is therefore internal to the right to strike. It is very likely that the right to bargain collectively, essential in Article 11 terms, also has “core” and “accessory” elements to it.’
Full Story
Oxford Human Right Hub, 10th May 2024
Source: ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk
