‘The Sentencing Council has published a revised guideline for judges and magistrates on the sentencing of dangerous dog offences. The new guideline, which has been issued following a public consultation, will come into effect on 1 July 2016.’
Sentencing Council, 17th March 2016
‘A man who tried to rape a toddler and sexually assaulted two other children has been jailed for 14 years.’
The Independent, 16th March 2016
Source: www.independent.co.uk
‘Judges feel unappreciated, demoralised and resent cuts to their pay, according to a recently retired member of the court of appeal.’
The Guardian, 14th March 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘A teenager rapist has had his suspended sentence replaced by a three-year term in a young offenders institution after the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal.’
BBC News, 15th March 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
‘Shaken baby syndrome is back in the news. Monday’s BBC Panorama programme focused on this most contentious of subjects and was itself prompted by the General Medical Council’s prosecution of Dr Waney Squier, a consultant neuropathologist who used to give evidence against those charged with injuring their baby but now provides expert evidence in their defence. On Friday she was found guilty by the GMC of giving “expert opinion evidence outside your field of expertise” in several cases that came before the criminal or family courts, and could be struck off the medical register as a result.’
The Guardian, 15th March 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘Home Secretary Theresa May has defended controversial new surveillance powers as MPs debated them for the first time.’
BBC News, 15th March 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
‘The Wednesday in an investigation into the track record of Anglican churches in England and Wales in preventing exploitation, dealing with perpetrators and helping survivors to overcome trauma and obtain justice.’
The Guardian, 16th March 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘The Criminalisation of Homosexuality: Human Rights Law on Trial
This seminar looks at a contemporary issue in human rights law: the criminalisation of homosexuality. Via this issue, the seminar assesses how international human rights law can be given effect at a domestic level, and the difficulties that can arise when litigants rely on international human rights in the domestic courts.’
Date: 16th March 2016, 4.30-6.00pm
Location: SW1.09 Somerset House, Strand, London WC2R 1LA
Charge: Free, registration required
More information can be found here.
‘Two expats are challenging a decision to bar British citizens who have lived elsewhere in Europe for more than 15 years from voting in the EU referendum.’
BBC News, 15th March 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
‘The comments will add further pressure on MPs to beef up the watchdog which polices their work, perhaps by giving members of the public a vote over decisions whether or not to reprimand errant MPs.’
Daily Telegraph, 15th March 2016
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk
‘Sports Direct boss Mike Ashley has been warned he could be in contempt of Parliament if he continues to refuse to appear in front of a committee of MPs. It sounds serious – but what could actually happen to him?’
BBC News, 16th March 2016
Source: www.bbc.co.uk
‘The couple found guilty of killing the Bristol teenager Becky Watts have lost the first stage of their appeals against their convictions and sentences.’
The Guardian, 15th March 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘In a paper on behalf of the Climate Change and Energy Working Party, UK Environmental Law Association (UKELA), Stephen Hockman QC and Benjamin Haseldine chart the possible implications of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union on climate change and energy law.’
Six Pump Court, 7th March 2016
Source: www.6pumpcourt.co.uk
‘Is an employer ever required to dis-apply an absence management policy or delay dismissal, as a reasonable adjustment for disability? Recent decisions have suggested that the answer is no, but in Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] IRLR 216, the Court of Appeal has redefined the correct comparator in a disability claim in a way which may make this easier for an employee to argue.’
Tanfield Chambers, 9th March 2016
Source: www.tanfieldchambers.co.uk
Planning, Environment & Property Newsletter (PDF)
39 Essex Chambers, February 2016+
Source: www.39essex.com
Gentry v Miller and another [2016] EWCA Civ 141
‘When dealing with an application under CPR r 13.3 to set aside a judgment in default of acknowledgement of service entered under CPR Pt 12 or an application under CPR r 39.3(5) to set aside a judgment given where a party did not attend the trial, the court should first establish whether the express requirements of rule 13.3 or rule 39.3(5) were satisfied and, if so, apply the three-stage test laid down for the exercise of the discretion under rule 3.9 to grant relief from sanctions. The first stage of the test, as to whether there was a serious or significant breach, applies to the applicant’s default in failing to acknowledge service or to attend trial, not to any subsequent delay in applying to set the judgment aside (paras 23–25).’
WLR Daily, 9th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Alan Ramsay Sales & Marketing Ltd v Typhoo Tea Ltd [2016] EWHC 486 (Comm)
‘The claimant was a commercial agent who acted for the defendant. The agency agreement between the parties provided for 12 months’ notice of termination. The claimant’s case was that, by e-mails dated 18 and 26 March 2013, the defendant gave notice of termination with effect from 11 February 2013, to terminate on 11 May 2013 and was thereby in repudiatory breach of contract, which repudiation the claimant accepted as bringing the agency agreement to an end. The claimant brought a claim for, inter alia, damages for termination with insufficient notice and sought to admit the defendant’s e-mails as evidence of the defendant’s repudiation. The defendant contended that the two e-mails, both marked “Without Prejudice”, were part of a series of without prejudice negotiations to settle a dispute as to termination of the agency and that, as such, they could not be relied on by the claimant as repudiatory and were inadmissible in evidence.’
WLR Daily, 8th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘In 2004 two banks entered into arrangements designed to take advantage of the provisions of Chapter 2 of Part 7 of the lncome Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, as substituted, which created a special regime for employment-related securities whereby “restricted securities” (including, by section 423(2), shares which were subject to a condition providing for their forfeiture in certain circumstances so as to render their market value less than it otherwise would be but for that condition) were, by section 425(2) and 429, exempt from income tax. Each bank invoked a scheme whereby (i) it set up a company merely for the purposes of the scheme, which undertook no activities beyond its participation in the scheme, was to be liquidated upon the termination of the scheme, and the memorandum and articles of which contained conditions designed to comply with Chapter 2, and (ii) the shares of the company were to be allocated to specified employees in lieu of a cash bonus. In the first case there was a condition for an immediate and automatic sale of the shares if, on any date during a specified three week period, the closing value of the FTSE 100 Index exceeded a defined “trigger level”, the probability of which was unlikely but in any event was hedged against so that in the event of a forced sale the employees would not be materially worse off. In the second case there was a provision which, in effect, provided that an employee would forfeit his shares if he voluntarily resigned or was dismissed for misconduct during the first eight weeks after the company was set up. In both cases, once the exemptions from income tax conferred by sections 425(2) and 429 had accrued, the shares were redeemable by the employees for cash. The revenue took the view that the banks were to be treated as having paid the relevant employees cash sums equal to their share allocation and issued PAYE determinations and NIC decisions against each bank, as the body liable to deduct such sums. Each bank appealed. The First-tier Tribunal, in separate decisions, held that Parliament could not have intended that the exemption should apply to arrangements contrived purely in order to obtain the exemption but having no other business or commercial purpose. On appeals heard together the Upper Tribunal held that the scheme in the first case met the requirements of the legislation and so allowed that bank’s appeal, but held that the scheme in the second case did not fully comply with the terms of Chapter 2 in that, on the facts, the company had been set up in a way which did not comply with section 429. On appeal by the revenue in the first case and by the bank in the second case, the Court of Appeal upheld the Upper Tribunal’s decision in the first case on like ground and, having reversed the factual finding in the second case, allowed that bank’s appeal on the ground that its scheme also met the requirements of Chapter 2.’
WLR Daily, 9th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Khan [2016] EWCA Civ 137
‘The applicant, a Pakistani national, entered the United Kingdom with leave to remain. On 20 February 2012, before the expiry of his leave, he applied under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 for further leave to remain as a Tier 4 student, intending to study at a particular college which at that time was a registered licensed sponsor. However, by the time the United Kingdom Border Agency came to consider his application, the licence of his sponsoring college had been revoked. The agency suspended consideration of the application to enable the applicant to find a new sponsor and then submit an application to vary the grounds of his original application for further leave to remain, which the applicant did on 9 October 2012. Paragraph 34E of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules provided that if a person wished to “vary the purpose” of an application for leave to remain, the variation had to comply with the requirements for making an application as if the variation were a new application, or the variation would be invalid. The agency refused the applicant’s application to vary the grounds of his original application since, on 9 October 2012, he did not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1A(a) of Appendix C to the Immigration Rules, which provided that an applicant had to have a certain level of maintenance funds “at the date of the application”. The applicant’s appeal against that decision was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal, holding that paragraph 34E did not apply in the applicant’s case since the applicant had not sought to vary the “purpose” of his application, which throughout had remained the same, namely to remain as a Tier 4 student; and that, therefore, the applicant had not been obliged to meet the maintenance fund requirements on 9 October 2012.’
WLR Daily, 18th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
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