‘Influential advisory body the Civil Justice Council has urged a measured approach to the adoption of a new online court for civil cases.’
Law Society’s Gazette, 30th March 2016
Source: www.lawgazette.co.uk
‘A developer sought planning permission for a development on Green Belt land comprising nine residential houses and a barn and associated dwellings for a livery business. The proposal involved redevelopment of previously developed land at a livery, the business of which was partly retained. The local planning authority refused planning permission. On the developer’s appeal, an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State considered that the proposal comprising new buildings was appropriate development and concluded that, applying the requirements of the sixth exception in para 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework (“NPPF”), the new buildings would not impact adversely either on the openness of the Green Belt or the purposes for designation of the Green Belt. He accordingly allowed the developer’s appeal. The local planning authority applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the inspector’s decision, contending, inter alia, that para 89, which listed six exceptions to the general policy that new buildings were inappropriate development in the Green Belt, should be interpreted to mean that development which was not only operational development for new buildings but also involved a material change in use for those buildings did not fall within the categories of appropriate development, and that therefore the inspector had erred in law in treating the proposal as appropriate development, since the construction of the new houses also involved a material change of use to residential or mixed residential and equestrian use.’
WLR Daily, 15th February 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Hargreaves v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] EWCA Civ 174
‘The taxpayer stated on his self-assessment tax return that he was to be regarded as provisionally non-resident and not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom with effect from a certain date. The revenue issued a discovery assessment against him under section 29 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 on the basis that he was not entitled to be treated as neither resident nor ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for tax purposes as he had not taken sufficient steps to become non-resident. The taxpayer appealed, first, against the contention that he was not in fact resident or ordinarily resident here, and, second, against the discovery assessment, alleging that it had been made without the revenue having any power to do so and therefore was invalid. He applied for a direction that the second issue be heard as a preliminary issue on the basis that he wanted to be able to elect not to give evidence until the revenue had proved its case on the relevant conditions in section 29(3). The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the application, determining that he had no right to require the revenue to establish at a separate preliminary hearing against the discovery assessment the matters which under section 29 the revenue should establish to show that the discovery assessment was validly made and that while it had a discretion to order a separate preliminary trial, it would not do so. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal, concluding that the taxpayer did not have any relevant right to a preliminary hearing and that it was possible to have a single hearing even though there were different burdens of proof on the two issues in the present case and that it would need to hear evidence on the issues together.’
WLR Daily, 22nd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
General Medical Council v Adeogba; General Medical Council v Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162
‘In each of two cases, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the General Medical Council (“the GMC”) against the respondent doctor. In neither case did the doctor concerned attend the disciplinary hearing. In the first case the doctor did not answer correspondence and did not attend the hearing because, knowing of the investigation and his time limited suspension, he left the United Kingdom and then failed to access the only means the GMC had to communicate with him. In the second case the doctor challenged the disciplinary process and refused to participate until his concerns had been addressed. Having considered the available evidence as to the reasons for non-attendance, in each case the separately constituted fitness to practise panel (“the panel”) determined to continue in the doctor’s absence under rule 31 of the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004 and, having examined and to some extent tested the evidence supporting the complaint, found the case proved in whole or in part. Both doctors were erased from the medical register. On appeal by the doctor in the first case, the judge, having admitted fresh evidence as to the reason for non-attendance, determined that the doctor could not have been aware of the hearing date and that the panel had been wrong to proceed in his absence. On appeal by the doctor in the second case, the judge found that there was no basis for the panel to conclude that the doctor would not attend in future if the matter were adjourned and had been wrong to proceed in his absence. In both cases, fresh hearings were ordered.’
WLR Daily, 16th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The UK was right not to charge any police officers over the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, an electrician who they thought was a suicide bomber, in 2005.’
The Independent, 30th March 2016
Source: www.independent.co.uk
One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris-Garner and another [2016] EWCA Civ 180
‘The defendants were a former director and manager of the claimant company who were found to have breached restrictive covenants not to compete, solicit clients or use confidential information belonging to the company. Losses were difficult to quantify. The judge gave the claimants the option of recovering damages on the Wrotham Park basis, being the amount which would notionally have been agreed between the parties, acting reasonably, as the price for releasing the defendants from the restrictions.’
WLR Daily, 22nd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The developer applied for outline planning permission for the development of 32 dwellings on a site lying outside the defined development boundaries and allocated sites set out in the local planning authority’s local plan. The local authority failed to determine the application and the developer appealed to the Secretary of State. The inspector appointed by the Secretary of State recognised that the main issue was whether the site was a suitable location for residential development having regard to the local plan and other considerations. He identified that the proposed development was in clear conflict with the location policy in the local plan, which policy remained in force and so retained its full weight as part of the statutory development plan. Having found therefore that para 14 of the National Planning Policy Framework (“the NPPF”) did not apply, the inspector went on to consider the policies of the NPPF as a whole, concluding that the proposed development constituted sustainable development so that the presumption in favour of sustainable development applied, that being a material consideration capable of outweighing the development plan, pursuant to section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. Accordingly, the inspector allowed the appeal and granted permission. The local authority challenged that decision pursuant to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 on the ground, inter alia, that the inspector had erred in law in failing properly to apply the approach to decision-taking set out in section 38(6)of the 2004 Act.’
WLR Daily, 16th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
General Medical Council v Michalak [2016] EWCA Civ 172
‘The claimant doctor made a complaint of discrimination against the respondent General Medical Council, alleging that, as a qualifications body, it had subjected her to a detriment in the course of its Fitness to Practise Panel procedure, contrary to section 53(2)(c) of the Equality Act 2010. At a preliminary hearing to determine whether the employment tribunal had jurisdiction under section 120 of the Act, an employment judge held that the claim was not excluded by section 120(7), as the act complained of was not subject “by virtue of an enactment” to “an appeal or proceedings in the nature of an appeal”, since there was no right of appeal under the Medical Act 1983 from a decision of the panel, nor did judicial review provide a means to challenge its decision. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the General Medical Council’s appeal, holding that judicial review proceedings were proceedings “in the nature of an appeal” that arose “by virtue of an enactment”, namely section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, that were available to the claimant, thereby precluding the jurisdiction of the employment tribunal.’
WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The Court of Protection is considering giving judges more power to make family members cover the legal costs in disputes over an incapacitated person’s property, affairs or care.’
Law Society’s Gazette, 30th March 2016
Source: www.lawgazette.co.uk
‘The European Court of Human Rights has held that the detention of an individual following his breach of a civil contact order, where he had no legal representation, did not violate his rights under Article 5, ECHR (Right to Liberty and Security of Person). However, the decision not to provide compensation to the individual following a failure to provide him with a lawyer during domestic proceedings resulted in a violation of Article 6 (Right to a Fair Trial).’
UK Human Rights Blog, 30th March 2016
Source: www.ukhumanrightsblog.com
‘Better partnerships and more effective information-sharing at the local level will be needed to reduce alcohol-related crime and disorder, the government has said.’
OUT-LAW.com, 29th March 2016
Source: www.out-law.com
‘The parties were married in September 2001 and had one daughter born in October 2002. The husband, a Saudi national, was a businessman of substantial means who married again in 2012 when the parties’ marriage broke down. On their divorce the wife applied for financial relief under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The husband applied to strike out the wife’s application , claiming immunity from suit as the permanent representative of St Lucia to the International Maritime Organisation (“IMO”), a post to which he had been appointed on 1 April 2014. The United Kingdom was required, as a matter of international law, to grant privileges and immunities to personal representatives of member states to the IMO in accordance with the Specialised Agencies Convention and the Headquarters Agreement. A permanent representative was entitled to the same immunity from suit and legal process as the head of a diplomatic mission, except that, by article 15 of the International Maritime Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 2002), a permanent representative who was permanently resident in the United Kingdom was only entitled to immunities and privileges in respect of his official acts. The Foreign Secretary certified that the Foreign Office had been informed by the IMO of the husband’s appointment as permanent representative of St Lucia, of his arrival date and had not been notified that his diplomatic functions had terminated. Although on the face of it that certificate was conclusive evidence of the husband’s appointment by virtue of section 8 of the International Organisations Act 1968, the judge balanced the husband’s claim to immunity against the wife’s rights to access to the courts under article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. He concluded that the husband had not undertaken any duties or performed any functions as permanent representative, that the appointment was an artificial construct to defeat the wife’s claims on the breakdown of the marriage and that, since the husband was permanently resident in the United Kingdom, he was entitled to immunity only in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions. In consequence the judge refused to strike out the wife’s claim.’
WLR Daily, 22nd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘The defendant pleaded guilty to three charges of rape … one charge of aiding and abetting rape, two charges of indecent assault and one charge of indecency with a child. He was initially sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment on each of the rape charges and on the aiding and abetting rape charge, and four years’ imprisonment on each of the other charges, the seven sentences to run concurrently. The sentences of 16 years were calculated by taking a starting point of 24 years and deducting one-third for the guilty pleas. Some four weeks later the sentencing judge had the case re-listed and, in reliance on the “slip rule” in Crim PR r 28.4, he changed the four sentences of 16 years to 18 years on the footing that a reduction of 25%, not one-third, was appropriate in view of the fact that the defendant had made no admissions when, much earlier, the complainant had made complaints but no prosecution had resulted. The defendant appealed against sentence. Permission to appeal was given by the single judge on the ground that it had been established in R v Nodjoumi (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 183 that it was incorrect to use the slip rule to change a sentence solely because the sentencing judge had, on reflection, concluded that the original sentence had been inadequate. On the hearing of the appeal, however, R v Nodjoumi was relied on only as support for a submission that the sentencing judge had not been justified in concluding that the reduction should be 25% rather than one-third.’
WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina v Nguyen, Attorney General’s Reference No 79 of 2015
‘The defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and to having an offensive weapon contrary to section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. He was sentenced to three years and four months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ imprisonment respectively. The Attorney General applied to the Court of Appeal under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. At the same time the prosecution applied to the Crown Court under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for the sentence to be varied on the grounds that new material showed that, contrary to the way in which the case had been presented at the sentencing hearing, the complainant had been specifically targeted by the defendant. The time limit for making a variation order was subsequently extended by a Crown Court judge, and a variation order was later made by the sentencing judge. The defendant appealed against the varied sentence. On the hearing in the Court of Appeal it was common ground that there was no power to extend the time limit for the making of a variation order, so that the variation order had been invalid.’
WLR Daily, 23rd March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina v Brooks [2016] EWCA Crim 44
‘Following the seizure of a large consignment of cocaine by the Irish navy, the defendant was convicted in the United Kingdom of conspiracy to import drugs and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the recorder ruled that the defendant had a criminal lifestyle for the purposes of section 75 of the 2002 Act. He assessed the defendant’s benefit as being a little over £3·6m, comprising the value of the drugs at just under £3m and a 50% interest in a Spanish property valued at £296,000, and held that the recoverable amount was the same as the benefit figure on the basis that, although the defendant’s identifiable assets amounted to just under £1,400, he had undisclosed assets which he had failed to show were less than his benefit. Accordingly, the recorder made a confiscation order in the sum of the benefit figure. The defendant appealed against the order on the grounds that the recorder had erred in (i) including the value of the drugs in the benefit figure on the basis that the defendant had purchased them or contributed to their purchase, when there was no evidence that the defendant had done so; (ii) including the value of the drugs in the recoverable amount, when they had been seized by the Irish authorities; and (iii) including the value of the property in the recoverable amount, when under Spanish law the defendant’s partner was the legal and equitable owner.’
WLR Daily, 10th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Regina v Roberts (Mark) and others [2016] EWCA Crim 71
‘In each of the 13 applications before the court, the applicants applied for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentences of imprisonment or detention for public protection (“IPP”)), imposed between 2005 and 2008 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Before the sentence of IPP was amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the court was required to make the assumption that an offender was dangerous if he had been convicted on an earlier occasion of a specified offence, unless it was unreasonable to do so. Where he was found to be dangerous, and over 18, the court was required to pass a sentence of IPP or life imprisonment; the 2003 Act removed all discretion from the court once it was found that the offender was dangerous. All the applicants had either been detained in custody long after the expiry of the minimum term or had been recalled for breach of licence. The applicants submitted (1) that whatever might have been the position at the time the sentences of IPP were passed, the Court of Appeal had power under section 11 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to pass sentences that, in the light of what had happened over the intervening years, now would be the proper sentence; (2) the Court of Appeal should reconsider the assessments made by sentencing judges in the light of R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864; [2006] 1 WLR 2509, and (3) a time could and had been reached when the length of the imprisonment was so excessive and disproportionate compared to the index criminal offence that it could amount to inhuman treatment under article 3 or arbitrary detention under article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That was because the detention no longer had any meaningful link to the index offence. A much delayed review of a sentencing decision could therefore be a mechanism the court could employ to avoid a breach of those Convention Rights. As the period now served by each of the applicants was so much longer than any conceivable determinate sentence would have required, the continued detention amounted to preventative detention and was therefore arbitrary. ‘
WLR Daily, 18th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘Following three trials of former members of Jehovah’s Witnesses’s congregations on charges of historic sex abuse the Charity Commission decided to initiate a statutory inquiry relating to a leading Jehovah’s Witness charity’s safeguarding policy regarding vulnerable beneficiaries in particular children, under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011, and to order the charity to produce a wide range of documents, under section 52 of the Act, even though none of those accused was connected with the charity. .The applicants, the charity and its trustees, sought judicial review of those decisions, on the grounds that (i) the commission had acted disproportionately by commencing an inquiry the scope of which was vague and undefined and by interfering with the applicants’ Convention rights, and had thereby breached its duty to act fairly so that the decision was irrational; and (ii) the scope of the production order was disproportionate in that information was sought of a personal and sensitive nature, within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, and was furthermore in breach of the Convention rights of individuals affected. The judge in refusing permission to proceed with the judicial review clain held that the applicants had an effective statutory remedy by appealing to the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) (Charity) against a decision to initiate an inquiry, and that any complaint relating to the breadth of a production order could be dealt with before that tribunal.’
WLR Daily, 15th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
Swindon Borough Council v Webb (trading as Protective Coatings) [2016] EWCA Civ 152
‘Whilst hesitating to be prescriptive in a matter where the liberty of the subject is at stake, and where the circumstances are likely to be infinitely various, the procedure provided by CPR r 81.31 should be followed where a contemnor seeks his discharge before the expiry of his sentence (para 23).’
WLR Daily, 16th March 2016
Source: www.iclr.co.uk
‘A court case that would have tested the right of sex workers to offer services together in brothels to protect themselves has collapsed after a police officer refused to give evidence.’
The Guardian, 29th March 2016
Source: www.guardian.co.uk
‘A High Court judge has awarded the family member of an EU national a total of £136,048 in damages. The award consists of £76,578 for false imprisonment and £59,470 for breach of EU law. The Home Office is also criticised for having made “inaccurate and misleading” submissions to previous judges on multiple occasions and the damages include not just compensatory damages for lost earnings and distress but also special damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages.’
Free Movement, 30th March 2016
Source: www.freemovement.org.uk
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