‘It is very commonly the case that one authority needs to take account of the decisions of another, in order to carry out its own responsibilities. This lecture aims to give a general explanation of the approach that authorities ought to take toward such judgments. The principle of comity is a central element in such a general explanation. It is the principle that the authority passing judgment (I will call it the ‘second authority’) ought to act in a way that respects the capacity of the other (the ‘first authority’) to carry out its own role. A duty of comity is not a duty to trust the first authority. It does not require the second authority to approve of the decisions of the first. It is a duty that arises not from the rights of the first authority, nor even from the first authority’s success in carrying out its duties, but from the second authority’s duty to those whom it serves.’
Date: 27th February 2014, 6.00pm
Location: UCL Faculty of Laws, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG
Charge: Free, registration required
More information can be found here.
